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TRANSITION FROM BRITISH TO INDIAN RULE IN THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of Research for Near East and Africa
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

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SUMMARY

The transition from British to Indian rule in India's North West Frontier Province is complicated by problems of the defense of the Indian subcontinent at its most vulnerable frontier, by religious and political rivalries in the Province between the two major Indian political parties, by local nationalist aspirations, by the antipathy of the Muslim Pathan tribal population to any outside rule, and by recent claims of Afghan irredentists to the frontier area.

Before the arrival of the British in India the barren and mountainous frontier area overlooking the passes to India, between the Indus River and Afghanistan, was for centuries the invasion gateway to India. As a result its heterogeneous population had generally become a hardy and warlike people. However, under British rule three-fifths of the population have settled as farmers on the Indus and tributary plains and have abandoned much of their belligerent propensity.

After brief attempts by the Afghans and Sikhs to rule the frontier territory, it came under British suzerainty in 1849 following the second Anglo-Sikh War. To prevent disruptive tribal warfare and ensure India against attack by Afghanistan or Russia, Britain maintained strict military control over the frontier territory. This has involved almost constant warfare against recalcitrant tribes in the so-called "unsettled areas" where the people still live under a tribal social organization. British frontier military policy passed successively through four stages; (1) a stationary "closed border" policy (1849-76), (2) an aggressive policy that carried British control into the mountainous border area by force (1876-99), (3) a cautious policy of withdrawing direct control and maintaining mobile reserves on the Indus River for punitive action (1899-1920),

and (4) a policy of gradually assuming direct control over the tribal areas with the consent of the inhabitants (1920 to the present). The result has been to link most of the tribes with their neighbors in the settled areas and with the rest of India by roads and substantial economic ties, but there is still very little assimilation to India's way of life or political interests.

Direct British administration of the settled areas, the core of the North West Frontier Province created in 1901, resulted in its progressive incorporation into the all-India framework. Further ties with the rest of India developed after 1930 when the Muslim Pathan Red Shirt Party, organized by a frontier landowner, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, affiliated with the Congress Party and interjected nationalist politics into the Province. Following the announcement of the Cabinet Mission Plan (May 16, 1946), the Red Shirt Party's political supremacy in the Province was challenged by a Muslim League opposition party advocating the inclusion of the Province in Pakistan. The provincial Muslim League, attacking the Red Shirt provincial government as an affiliate of the Hindu-dominated Congress Party, gained strength until, at the time of Prime Minister Attlee's statement in February 1947 announcing the possible partition of India, it openly defied the Red Shirt ministry by a "civil disobedience" campaign. The British, convinced that the western Punjab would join Pakistan and thus isolate the frontier from the rest of India, arranged to hold a referendum in the Frontier Province in July 1947 on the choice between joining Pakistan or Congress India.

The Red Shirt Party, to maintain its hold on the Province, called for an alternative referendum allowing voters to choose between Pakistan and an "independent" Pathanistan, a state to be composed of all Pushtu-speaking people of northwestern India. Assured of the tacit support of the Congress Party, the Red Shirt

leader decided to boycott the referendum and to oppose the Pakistan issue at the first provincial legislative elections on an independent Pathanistan platform. The age-old Pathan desire for freedom from outside control competes for their allegiance with the almost equally attractive appeal of a Muslim-dominated Pakistan. This conflict threatens to disrupt the peaceful partition of India and to jeopardize the defense and stability of India's most exposed frontier. Official Afghan support for an independent Pathanistan further complicates the situation.

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TRANSITION FROM BRITISH TO INDIAN RULE IN THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Land

The North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of India, often called the last frontier of the British empire, is a narrow belt of mountainous territory stretching north from Baluchistan to the lower ranges of the Hindu Kush and crossed by five passes connecting Afghanistan and India. Except for the narrow plains of the Indus and its tributaries, a buttress of high barren mountains dominates the Province. The lower ranges of the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush Mountains cross the north and northwestern sections while to the southwest and south the Safed Koh and Sulaiman ranges continue the broad mountain barrier. Five rivers roughly corresponding to the five main passes flow toward India and drain into the Indus. The rivers from north to south, the Swat, Kabul, Kurram, Tochi, and Gomal enter, respectively, through the Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, Tochi, and Gomal passes. The river valleys form the only fertile areas in the mountainous tracts.

Climatically, its location between the weather belts of India and those of the Central Asian highlands exposes the Province to extremes of heat and cold. Despite the great seasonal and diurnal changes in temperature, rice, maize, wheat, barley, sugar cane, cotton, tobacco, and fruit are grown in the fertile valleys and irrigated regions of the foothills. The Province is still far from self sufficient in foodstuffs but programs of irrigation and land exploitation have markedly improved the economic welfare of the people since the beginning of the present century.

The Province is divided for administrative purposes into the settled or administered region of the plains and the tribal or

unadministered territory of the mountains. The settled area is subdivided administratively into the six districts (from north to south) of Hazara, Mardan, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. The tribal territory is divided into the five agencies of Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan. These districts and agencies were delimited roughly to correspond to the territory inhabited by one or more tribes. The Waziristan agencies, for example, include the homelands of the Wazirs and Mahsuds, two of the most important tribes of the Province.

B. The People

Over 3,100,000 of the 5,500,000 people (1941 census) living in the NWFP are located in the settled area which is one-third of the provincial area; the remaining 2,400,000 inhabit the inhospitable mountain wastes from Chitral to South Waziristan. Collectively these people are known as Pathans - strictly speaking, a linguistic rather than an ethnic term. They speak a common tongue called Pushtu or Pukhtu, a branch of the eastern Iranian group of languages.[1] Pushtu-speaking Pathans inhabit not only the Province but also the northern tip of Baluchistan and the southern and eastern mountains of Afghanistan. Of the Province's non-Pathan minorities, the chief group is the population of Chitral and northern Swat which is believed to be aboriginal. In addition, small colonies of Hindus and Sikhs, composing about 5 percent of the population, are scattered through the remainder of the Province.[2] Another type of minority appears among the Pathans themselves. The majority are orthodox Sunni Muslims but a few clans in the mountains belong

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1. Pushtu has now replaced Persian as Afghanistan's official language.

2. According to the 1931 Census the NWFP contained the following minorities: 143,000 Hindus, 43,000 Sikhs, and 12,000 Christians.

to the Shiah sect.

A heterogeneous and hardy people, the Pathans are descendents of the various invaders of India - Indo-Aryan, Scythian, Persian, Greek, and Afghan - who swept through the high barren passes of the frontier to the richer plains below. Over the centuries the Pathan tribesmen of the mountains supplemented their living by periodic raids on the villages of neighboring and related tribes settled in the plains and by exacting tribute from traders and others moving through the passes. Environment, upbringing, tradition, and a militant religiou have made them a fierce, untamed, proud, and self-reliant people who recognize no authority except that based on personal courage or leadership within the tribe and who resent any sort of supervision from the outside. Those who have acquired land in the valleys have become settled and generally law-abiding cultivators. While inter-village disputes still frequently end in blows, the feeling that every man is an enemy unless proved a friend has been steadily displaced by concern for community welfare and responsibility stemming from the greater economic security of agricultural village life.

Although it is generally true that the mountain Pathan is generous and hospitable, his precarious existence makes him extremely warlike and distrustful when he is not actually treacherous, cruel, and greedy. He is quick to resist any encroachment on his territory and easily aroused to religious fanaticism. These characteristics are not universal, however, and as the customs, habits, and mores of the various tribes directly affect any negotiations with or concerning them, some discussion of tribal variations becomes pertinent.

In the far north live the non-Pathan Chitralis who are frequently described as listless, unwarlike farmers. Their

passivity is reflected in their system of government. They have been content to live under an absolute ruler, the Mehtar of Chitral, who originally established himself as an intermediary chieftain between the ruler of Kashmir and the Chitralis, and for fifty years has accepted the joint suzerainty of Britain and Kashmir. Except for a small minority of Ismaili Muslims, who are followers of the Agha Khan, the Chitralis are Sunni Muslims who make a precarious living on the rocky mountain slopes of the area.

South of Chitral the state of Swat, parts of Bajaur and Buner, and the Peshawar valley are inhabited by Yusufzai[1] tribes, frugal and abstemious specimens of Pathans noted for their strong tribal loyalty and fighting ability. Their religious fanaticism is easily fanned by their mullahs (religious leaders) who have been responsible for most of the anti-British disturbances and raids on settled areas in the northern part of the Province. Economic conditions are less severe in this area than in Chitral. The inhabitants have accepted a form of feudalism under the most powerful and influential chieftains of the area.[2] Bajaur is the home of the Mamand, Salarzai, and Utman Khel tribes, easily influenced by political mullahs. This area has long been a center of intrigue against the British and a region over which British authorities have exerted little effective control.

To the west, overlapping the boundary with Afghanistan, lies the inhospitable territory of the Mohmand tribes, who are

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1. The Pushtu suffix "zai" means "son of," which reflects the belief popular among the Pathans that all members of a tribe are descendants of a common ancestor.

2. The most notable of these chieftains are the Nawabs of Dir and Amb; the Wali of Swat; the Khans of Nawagai, Khar, and Pashat; and Badshah Gul, not a recognized ruler but a leader with great influence in Bajaur and Mohmand tribal territory as an anti-British agitator.

characterized as fierce, treacherous, and cruel, but recklessly brave and dangerous fighters. Their looting in the plains, resulting in part from economic hardships and in part from religious fanaticism, has plagued the British more than most tribal depredations because they can easily escape retribution by moving across the Afghan border.

South of the Mohmand territory in the vicinity of the Khyber Pass and the upper valley of the Tirah River live the Afridis, whose periodic raids on goods moving through the pass have been largely stopped by seasonal payments made by the Government of India in exchange for their guarding the pass. The barren terrain which the Afridis occupy coupled with their opportunity for plunder may help explain not only their intensely individualistic outlook and the absence of any strongly developed tribal authority but also their extreme distrust, cruelty, and greed. Once their personal confidence is gained they are capable of great devotion.

The Orakzais live in the southern valley of the Tirah where they gain a bare living from the few fertile areas in that region. The Shiah Muslim clans of the Orakzais have in the past requested British protection against their Sunni Muslim neighbors with the result that the Orakzais in general have caused little trouble for the British. Southeast of the Orakzais are the better-educated Bangash tribes, whose territory, with the exception of one village, lies completely within the administered areas. They have become stable citizens under the direct rule of law enforced by the settled area's administration and make good soldiers in the Indian Army. The same can be said of the Khataks who live completely in the settled areas of the Peshawar and Kohat districts, and who have shown themselves willing to assist the British, particularly in border skirmishes against neighboring mountain

tribes. The Khataks are considered by many British to be the finest type of Pathan -- hard working, honest, brave, intelligent, and progressive, living proof of what civilization can make of the Pathan under favorable circumstances.

The two remaining major tribes of the NWFP are found in the southwest: the Darwesh Khel Wazirs who inhabit western Waziristan between the Sulaiman range and the Kurram valley and the Mahsuds who occupy central and eastern Waziristan. These tribes inhabit some of the most barren and inhospitable terrain of the frontier and have proved to be the most turbulent. In the last hundred years the British have been forced to send seventeen punitive expeditions against the Darwesh Khel Wazirs entailing enormous expenditures on the part of the Government of India.

C. Tribal Government

The almost complete absence of formal government among the mountain Pathans can be attributed less to lack of contact with civilizing influences than to the unsuitability of such political organization to life in the unsettled areas and to the individualistic attitude of the Pathan. The tribesmen enforce their rigid Code of Honor (Pakhtunwali), the violation of which is punished effectively by lasting dishonor and ostracism. This code requires the tribesman to grant all fugitives the right of asylum if proper intercession is made, to proffer open-handed hospitality even to his deadliest enemy, and to wipe out insult with insult. The principles of asylum and hospitality, however, exist only in the Pathan's home, outside the visitor being no longer a guest and perhaps finding his erstwhile host a treacherous enemy.

A natural consequence of the Pathan Code of Honor is the persistence of numerous blood feuds that set tribe against tribe, clan against clan, family against family. Feuds are very common,

particularly among the Afridis, Wazirs, and Mahsuds, and are passed from father to son as a debt of honor. The feuds are aggravated by regional and religious factionalism, by disputes over zar, zan o zamin -- money, women, or land -- and by real or imagined insults of every description. The lack of loyalty to any common political allegiance among the tribes of the unsettled area is the concomitant of this constant internecine warfare. In the past, joint if not cooperative action has occasionally been achieved by appeals to religious fanaticism usually directed against the British or by promises of loot in Afghanistan.

In the Pathan's highly individualistic type of society each man is virtually a law unto himself, complete master in his own home, and ordinarily unwilling to accept any form of government even within his own tribe or clan in which he does not participate personally. Tribal government which functions in matters affecting the entire community consists of a tribal or clan council known as a jirgah made up of adult males. Local chiefs or maliks and Muslim religious leaders known as mullahs or pirs loosely guide the jirgahs, but their authority depends entirely on either their own personal prowess as great fighters or the tribe's acceptance of them as mystics or religious leaders. The decisions of the jirgah are enforceable only by tactics of active contempt and ostracism on the part of the entire tribe against the offender. But if the jirgah condemns another clan or an outside tribe, an armed tribal force or lashkar can be employed to punish the accused or to take revenge. Although the entire territory uses the jirgah system of community government, the tribes north of the Kabul River are often loosely federated under hereditary chiefs or khans and show themselves more willing to accept some sort of central authority than those south of the river. Where

the jirgahs in the north are commonly composed only of maliks, mullahs, and tribal elders, those in the south are ordinarily larger, sometimes consisting of every adult male.

Under the local system of land tenure each mountain tribe and clan occupies a well-defined tract of land, held in joint ownership, which is divided into approximately equal shares among the tribesmen. A system of periodical redistribution (ordinarily every thirty years) of the tribal land still prevails in parts of the tribal areas although the hill people are gradually realizing the value of fixed tenure. The redistribution system is in large measure responsible for slowness in developing irrigation, building substantial houses, and making land improvements.

Before the advent of the British in the Province, the people of the "settled" areas used the jirgah system in much the same manner as did their kinsmen in the mountains. Even under the present British-Indian form of government, with its common law courts and police system, the settled areas continue to use the jirgah to dispose of sundry matters of local concern.[1]

D. History

The history of the frontier area has been a story of constant warfare. Chronic tribal struggles against their neighbors on the Indian or Afghan side have been interspersed with periodic

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1. C. C. Davies, Problem of the North West Frontier, 1890-1908 (New York, 1932) pp. 53-54. The Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation Act of 1887 and the superseding Frontier Crimes Regulation Act of 1901 both recognized the jirgah system while limiting its powers. The latter regulation empowered the provincial Deputy-Commissioner to make civil and criminal references to a Council of Elders (jirgah) of three or more persons convened according to tribal custom, while reserving for the Deputy-Commissioner the right to remand the case for further investigation, either to refer to it to a jirgah nominated by himself, or to sanction the judgment of the jirgah provided it was agreed on by at least three quarters of the members.

opportunities for adventure and loot made available to Pathan tribesmen by successive major invasions of India. Throughout historic times empire builders and seekers of empire have pushed from the Near East or Central Asia through the mountains of Afghanistan and the five frontier passes into India.[1] In general invaders have either carved out empires within India or, like the early Persians and Greeks, have shortly returned to their home territories retaining no control over their briefly held conquests.

1. Period of the Afghan Empire. For three thousand years Afghanistan has been the base for empire-seekers moving toward India. Mahmud the Turk and his successors followed conquests of Afghanistan by invasion and conquest of northern India. In the sixteenth century India was invaded by Babor, a descendant of the Mongol invaders of Central Asia who had set up his overlordship at Kabul. Babor moved the seat of government from Kabul to Delhi and shortly thereafter Mogul suzerainty became limited to the Indian side of the mountain barrier and did not extend beyond peshawar and Kashmir. By the end of the seventeenth century, when Mogul power in India was on the wane, the Persians under the famous Nadir Shah absorbed half of Central Asia, and, with the aid of tributary troops among whom Afghans were an important element, conquered and annexed northwestern India down to Lahore.

Persian rule of India from beyond the mountain barrier was never consolidated. On Nadir Shah's death in 1756 an Afghan general

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1. From the Indo-Afghan frontier across the northern stretches of India to the Bay of Bengal and Burma, India is set off from the rest of continental Asia and Europe by the Himalayas. In Baluchistan, where the mountain barrier turns into rocky hills, hundreds of miles of utterly dry and barren desert discourage the invader.

in the Persian armies succeeded in getting himself recognized as king by the tribes in Afghanistan and attempted to hold the western part of Nadir Shah's realm as an Afghan empire. The tributary Afghan empire, which comprised the eastern part of Nadir Shah's empire, began to disintegrate around 1775. Shortly thereafter Baluchistan, Kalat, and Sind resumed their independence and were generally successful in resisting subsequent attempts to reimpose Afghan suzerainty. Amirs of the Afghan Durani tribe, ruling from Kandahar and later from Kabul, were unable to exercise any effective authority in India even though members of two leading Durani families were in direct control of Peshawar, Kashmir, Multan, and Lahore on the Indian side of the mountain barrier. At the turn of the century Kashmir and Peshawar were used by rival Durani clans (the Sadozai and Barakzai) as a springboard for rebellion against Afghanistan. Once the Barakzai got the upper hand in Afghanistan they too lost control of the Indian side of the border.[1]

2. Rise of the Sikh State. Afghanistan lost the North West Frontier Area in 1818 to the brief and much more effective control by the Sikh state of the Punjab. Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler, replaced the Afghan ruler of Peshawar with one of his own military governors. Pathans recruited from the plains villages for the Sikh army were obliged to conduct punitive expeditions into the mountain territory. Although the North West Frontier peoples have been obliged to acknowledge the suzerainty of every successive power

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1. The Afghans lost control not only in Lahore, Multan, and Kashmir, where the local population was not related to any of the peoples of Afghanistan, but also in Peshawar which was predominantly a Pathan city. Although a Barakzai continued as ruler there for some years he recognized the suzerainty of Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of Lahore, and was considered an enemy of his half brother Dost Muhammed in Kabul.

that has held northwestern India no interference in internal tribal administration occurred until British rule succeeded that of the Sikhs in the 1840's.

3. British on the Frontier. The British became concerned over Russian expansion southward into Central Asia during the first half of the nineteenth century when the East India Company was extending its control over northern India. The possible establishment of Russian influence in Persia and Afghanistan was viewed as a menace to British ambitions for a continuous sphere of influence extending from India to the Mediterranean. With a view to forestalling Russia the Company decided to create a puppet Afghanistan even though it was not yet in control of the states on the Indian side of the border. The British victory in the first Afghan War of 1839-42, when they placed their nominee on the throne of Kabul, was short lived.[1]

It was not until after the Sikh Wars of 1846 and 1849 when the British annexed the Punjab State that they actually gained control of the frontier. No attempt was made at that time to demarcate the boundary between the frontier territory and Afghanistan. As a result, the tribes in the mountainous area were left almost entirely to themselves, and control continued to be limited to punitive action taken in retaliation against depredations.

The history of the frontier under the British is marked by the gradual integration of the settled areas into the common system of Indian administration with the extension of British

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1. The British were unfortunate in their choice of a puppet. He was unable to maintain himself in the constant struggle over the throne and their administrative advisers and army were shortly forced to withdraw.

military control over the tribal territory punctuated by periodic uprisings. In 1863 a formidable uprising occurred because of increasing tribal resentment of British encroachments and the anti-British incitements of Afghans and Indian Muslim fanatics, including deserters from the Great Mutiny of 1857.[1] The great revolt of 1897 spread from one end of the tribal territory to the other and required tens of thousands of troops to put it down.

The second Afghan War of 1878-81 developed from the Afghan reception of a Russian mission when a British resident was not permitted in Kabul. As a result of this conflict the British took over the Khyber Pass, its environs, and most of the Kurram valley south of it, and also assumed control of Afghanistan's foreign relations.[2] In 1893 the Durand Boundary Mission in cooperation with Kabul authorities demarcated the international boundary between northwestern India and Afghanistan.[3] A "holy war" launched in 1919 by the new Amir of Afghanistan and accompanied by widespread tribal uprisings was decisively won by the British. The Amir profited, however, by regaining control of his foreign relations under a new British policy which sought to build up a strong and friendly Afghanistan as the best defense of the frontier area.

The area was separated from the Punjab in 1901 and established as the North West Frontier Province under a High Commissioner. In

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1. The so-called Hindustani Fanatics established themselves in the Black Mountains of Hazara from which they led the tribesmen in raids and depredations on the settled areas until the British forces overran their territory in the Ambeyla Campaign of 1863.
2. This control was tenuous, however; the Government of India's representative in Kabul was an Indian Muslim who merely kept an eye on Afghan affairs.
3. See map at end.

1932 the Province was placed under a Governor with an Indian, Sir Abdul Quaiyyum, as Chief Minister. The Indian Ministry after April 1937 assumed additional powers under the Government of India Act of 1935.

II. STRATEGIC AND DOMESTIC IMPORTANCE OF THE AREA

A. Strategic Position

1. Problems of India's Defense. The Problem of India's defense from an attack by land has long been that of defending her northwestern gateway.[1] This defense has involved three factors: (1) military control of the northwest frontier and Baluchistan; (2) the attitudes and relations of the tribes on the northwest frontier to the government or governments of India; and (3) India's relations with Afghanistan.

a. Military. Military strategy for the defense of northwestern India centers in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. The five main frontier passes offering access to India are not connected laterally and effective defense can be guaranteed only through the concentration of sufficient mobile armed forces in the rear along the Indus River to fortify any one of the passes in an emergency. Furthermore, defensive action taken in the NWFP itself would probably not be sufficient, as the British have found it necessary on three occasions to use Government of India troops to occupy Afghanistan in order to meet threats of pressure against India.

British Baluchistan, acquired in 1876, has been generally

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1. The importance of the northeastern gateway is negligible now that Japan is no longer a menace and is too divided by internal conflict to be a danger.

peaceful compared with the Pathan frontier area. The British brought Baluchistan into close and effective communication with both Sind and the Punjab, and so long as Indian forces maintain their present position they can threaten the flank of any possible invasion through Afghanistan.

b. Relations with the Tribes. The traditional attitude of the Pathan tribesmen toward the successive invaders of India has been to permit their transit through the passes leading to India unless established Pathan homes and farms in the Peshawar plains were threatened. During the last century the British invader has not been interested in transit privileges alone but in controlling and policing the "unsettled" areas as a means of ensuring that border defenses were not jeopardized by the depredations of the tribesmen. British efforts to penetrate the "unsettled" areas have invariably aroused bitter resentment among the resident tribes. The British have stationed Political Agents in the "unsettled" areas and have supported their agents' decisions with armed force or economic blockade and fines. Since approximately a fourth of the Pathan "nation" lives in Afghanistan west of the Durand Line from north of Kabul to the borders of Baluchistan, the British or the Indians must depend on the cooperation of the Afghan authorities in the task of tranquilizing the tribesmen. The tribal problem clearly requires Indo-Afghan good-will and cooperation.

c. Indo-Afghan Relations. Afghan anti-British agitation, supported by dissident refugee Indians within Afghanistan, was unabated throughout the nineteenth century despite the British victory in the First Afghan War and the quelling of the Mutiny of 1857. British control of Kabul's foreign relations following the Second Afghan War (1878) was much resented even though the resident

agent of the Government of India was a Muslim Indian, not a British national. Afghanistan continued to afford refuge to Indian dissidents and to give sympathy and sometimes direct encouragement to the frontier tribesmen in their attacks against the British.

Although the Afghan Amir kept his country neutral during World War I, he refused entry to Britishers and permitted Turkish and German agents to operate freely and to pursue their subversive propaganda and agitation into the border territory where revolutionary elements from the Indian side were particularly active. Following World War I the Amir apparently could not resist pressure from Anglophobe Afghan factions to embark upon a third war against the British in India, a move also welcomed by Indian revolutionaries. The British won the war but developed a new policy of friendly relations. The control of Afghanistan's foreign relations was given up and effective British support was furnished to the Amir to quell local revolts. A Britisher was admitted to Kabul as Resident and British assistance was furnished the Afghan army. The interest of successive Amirs in the amenities of western culture also resulted in strengthening Afghan-British friendship.

This improvement in Indo-Afghan relations was accompanied by an equally important postwar shift in power relationships throughout the Near East. Turkey, intent upon a revolutionary program of social and political reform, abandoned anti-British intrigues. Afghan relations with Russia were temporarily improved after the Bolshevik revolution, when Russian subsidies and assistance in the construction of roads and communications benefited Afghanistan. However, as the Communist regime consolidated its power in Russia, the Afghans began to fear the steady pressure exerted by its Soviet neighbor.

Whereas in the nineteenth century the British Government of India was the expanding power and the Afghans welcomed Russia as a counter influence, since the 1920's the positions have been reversed. In recent years the Amirs have readily accepted British-Indian economic assistance and military aid in handling tribal uprisings and depredations on the Afghan side of the border, and for the first time have expressed willingness to assist in moving against refugee tribesmen from the Indian side. British officials who have cooperated with Afghan authorities for the purpose of safeguarding Indian interests have stressed the importance of strengthening the authority of the Amirs in order to make such cooperation effective.[1]

2. Possible Sources of Attack on the North West Frontier Province

a. Afghanistan. The abortive Afghan attempt to invade India after World War I, the first since the eighteenth century was primarily an anti-western holy war directed against the British and not against the Indians. As the religious factor would not apply against the Pathans or Muslim Pakistan, only three contingencies remain under which Afghanistan might attack India: (1) in collusion with disaffected Indian groups as, for example, a situation like the Sikh-Afghan combination against Kashmir in the early nineteenth century; (2) in collaboration with the Pathan border tribes, such as threatened during the third Afghan War; of (3) in cooperation with some strong outside power. Both Pakistan and the Pathans will be wary of inviting Afghan military assistance unless they are assured that such aid would not threaten

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1. Control by the government over the tribes has steadily increased, as testified by the fact that the assassination of the last Amir in 1933, apparently an incident of personal political revenge, was not made the occasion for a general uprising or contest over the succession.

their own territories. The possibility of the third contingency is evident in the tacit assent of Afghanistan to German activity on the border in both world wars and to Soviet activity in the recent war. The importance of cultivating positive Afghan-Indian cooperation is therefore apparent.

b. U.S.S.R. Despite British fears, or perhaps as a result of British counter-measures, neither Czarist Russia nor the Soviet regime ever made any serious effort to displace British predominance at Kabul as a prelude to an invasion of India. Czarist activities in Afghanistan were apparently intended to cultivate the nuisance value of the country and possibly to strengthen Russia's position generally in the field of international bargaining. After Afghanistan assumed control of its foreign relations in the 1920's, the USSR opened an embassy at Kabul and on February 28, 1921, concluded a secret treaty which was subsequently reaffirmed.[1] In point of fact, however, the British position has steadily strengthened as a result of assistance afforded the Afghan Amir in quelling local trouble. American influence in Afghanistan has also increased greatly since World War II. Although the USSR emerged from the war as the only power strong enough to mount an effective invasion into northwest India, the situation in India is not ripe for active Soviet intervention and immediate international considerations counsels Soviet cultivation of Indian good will. The USSR appears to be content at the moment to encourage Indian revolutionary activities against the British.

B. Domestic Importance

1. Tribal Plunderings. British attempts to maintain order and

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1. It is not known if Britain has been confidentially informed of the treaty's contents, but it probably involved some Russo-Afghan collaboration against hostile British activity in India.

to prevent the continuous succession of local raids and depredations on the settled areas have been unavailing. Raiding parties vary in size from groups of two or three to lashkars (tribal armed forces) consisting of large numbers of tribesmen. Hundreds of times a year the plains are subjected to plundering excursions which take their toll in robbery, kidnapping, arson, and murder. Statistics on serious crime over the past fifty years indicate a steady increase,[1] though a considerable portion of the rise in recorded crime is attributable to improved statistics and another portion to increase both in the number of potential raiders and in the size of the potential loot. Raiders have also acquired better arms and become more difficult to oppose.

Although the British have expanded the settled areas, progressively broken down the isolation of the tribal groups, and afforded opportunity to an increasing number of Pathans for peaceful means of livelihood, much of the inveterate hostility of the tribal population to Britain persists. In 1919 frontier tribesmen, influenced in no small measure by the agitation of Indian nationalists, joined the Afghans in the "holy war" and continued to fight even after the Afghans had sued for peace. After a period of comparative quiet from 1923 to the early 1930's tribal unrest revived, partly in response to recrudescence of

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1. The figures for murder, homicide, and serious injury rose from 709 in 1902 to 2,045 in 1929. (Sir William Barton, India's North-West Frontier [London, 1939], p. 71.) A Government of India report states that 611 raids into the settled districts in 1919-20 resulted in 298 British subjects killed, 392 wounded, and 463 kidnapped (Indian Politics, 1921-22, p. 11). As recently as November, 1946, Pandit Nehru informed the Interim Government that the actual number of Hindus kidnapped, apart from Muslims, had been high even during the war and had since risen substantially (Hindustan Times, November 13, 1946). A Peshawar newspaper of October, 1946 attributed to economic causes and depression the fact that Provincial crime was up in nearly every month of the year (Khyber Mail, October 4, 1946).

political mass agitation in India and partly as a result of economic distress. In Peshawar this unrest was utilised by Abdul Ghaffar Khan to build up an effective political organization which was indirectly linked with the Congress Party. Political considerations have contributed somewhat to Pathan unrest, but the major reasons for the depredations are social, religious, and economic.

2. Causes

a. Economic factors. The fertile districts of the Province paralleling the Indus River contrast sharply with the barren, arid mountainous areas which even in the best years afford a livelihood just short of starvation. Under these circumstances the tribesmen have developed their habit of raiding and plundering the plains as a means of supplementing the meager output of their own fields. The hill Pathans are most expert guerilla fighters, hardy and individualistic in the extreme, whereas the plains settlers have become unwarlike and easy prey.

Except in rare cases,[1] irrigation and planned cultivation are unknown in the hills. Other forms of development[2] are confined mainly to the building of roads, levy posts, and military cantonments. By means of such employment, by raids, and to a limited extent by farming and grazing the tribesmen have been able to subsist.

b. Anti-British attitudes. The British incurred the hostility of the tribes by attempting to establish a close and continuous

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1. When the British first entered the almost inaccessible Khaisora valley of the Mahsuds in 1902 they found it to be a sizeable and extremely fertile area, well irrigated by canals. Davies, op. cit., p. 131.

2. A Kohat Pass factory, the first in the area, has been producing rifles for years except for a brief interlude redently when an enterprising Afridi headman used it to produce counterfeit Afghan currency. Barton, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

control over the territory. Previous administrations had operated by indirect control, similar to the pattern familiar in Afghanistan, the suzerain power sending only periodic expeditions into tribal territory to raise taxes and military levies or to inflict punishment for depredations. British policy, although not constant, has been aggressive on the whole. From time to time tribal territory has been annexed, allegedly on the request of tribal leaders but without reference to the inhabitants.[1] The tribesmen's economic advancement has sometimes been sacrificed to further military or strategic facilities such as roads, and the actions of the British in keeping the independent and s ettled areas of the Province apart by an artificial boundary have been resented by the Pathans in the settled areas. Finally, villages have sometimes been bombed in retaliation for offences.

The most disturbing aspect of the present situation, from the standpoint of future law and order, is that the Forces on the frontier, which have hitherto been exclusively under British control and which have commanded the respect of the tribesmen, are soon to be replaced by a force whose composition is as yet undetermined, but which may include Pakistan, British and perhaps Indian troops.

3. Factors Complicating Control

a. Insistence on personal freedom. The Pathan's determination to preserve his own personal freedom has reduced tribal government in the "unsettled areas" to semi-anarchy.[2] Their leaders can hardly be expected to establish effective control

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1. Davies, op. cit., p. 182.
2. See Chapter I, Section B. A traveller through the Khyber Pass may see typical tribal dwellings, encircled with walls and topped by watchtowers, which insure the clan's readiness for any attack and eloquently demonstrate their distrust of anyone outside the clan.

in situations where a disagreeing tribesman may end their attempt by a well-aimed rifle shot. Cultivation of village fields always ends several hundred yards short of a possible ambush point. Traditions of thievery and plundering have been handed down from generation to generation among the Pathans. From time immemorial the life of the fighter, the profits of war, and the prestige afforded by successful outlawry have been highly valued by the hill Pathan. War brought added income in the form of supply contracts and service in native police forces. Peace, on the other hand, meant distasteful labor on irrigation schemes, new buildings, roads and cantonments or degrading work in the fields on the same level as the plains Hindu.

b. Topographical factors. The terrain of the tribal homeland itself made any improvement of administration, police, education or economic opportunities exceedingly difficult. Tribesmen know the difficult mountains as no outsider does and can always escape across the border into Afghanistan if the pressure becomes too great. Any attempt to civilize and assimilate the independent hillsmen will encounter a most discouraging topographical problem.

c. Relations with Afghanistan. Pathan tribesmen in the mountains have traditionally looked to Afghanistan for refuge and support in their hostile activities against the British. The Afghan Amirs, resentful of losing an area that once formed part of the Afghan empire and anxious to embarrass the British wherever possible, formerly did everything in their power to foster and support the anti-British attitudes of the tribes. Since the late Nadir Khan came into power in 1929, however, Afghanistan has attempted to cooperate with Britain and India in curbing tribal depredations. Nadir Khan apparently realized the dangers inherent in irresponsible tribal activities as he himself had acquired the

throne at Kabul through the help of warlike Wazirs and Mahsuds, who looted the capital and returned to their homes convinced that king-making was profitable business.[1] The tendency of the independent tribes to interfere in Afghan politics aggravates the difficulties of Indian border control and of maintaining friendly Indian relations with Afghanistan. Informed observers agree that the tribal problem is unavoidably the joint responsibility of the two governments. It matters not what progressive administrative system is used on the Indian side of the Durand Line if a basis of cooperation with Kabul is not found.

d. Loyalties. The two basic considerations that have determined the development of political consciousness among the Pathans have been the anti-British sentiments which all of them entertained and their fanatical attachment to the Muslim faith. The two issues usually buttressed each other and aspiring leaders exploited both appeals in order to attract followings. Tribes whose territories had been opened up and converted into settled areas developed sympathies with the Indian nationalist movement championed by the Congress Party, so that tribal unrest frequently synchronized with nationalist agitation in the northwest generally. Since 1946, the activities of the Muslim League in introducing the communal issue have produced the anomaly of a home-grown

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1. In 1932 a son of an ex-Amir (Yaqub Khan) led large lashkars of Wazirs and Mahsuds against Afghan troops in Khost but they were eventually dispersed with British help. Later, in 1938, the Shami Pir, a famous Muslim divine from Baghdad, attempted to raise lashkars in Waziristan against Afghanistan, but although he received considerable tribal support, he was deported before he could cause much trouble. Still later, in September 1939, two sons of ex-Amir Amanullah's Governor of Kabul led an Afridi lashkar across the border toward Kabul only to be dispersed quickly by Afghan troops. Connelly, op. cit., pp. 117 and 131; Barton, op. cit., pp. 220-221; D-1255, Calcutta, October 16, 1939, CONFIDENTIAL.

Muslim Pathan political organization aligned with the Congress Party opposing a Muslim League organization made up of non-Pathan but Muslim Indians. This contest will doubtless be resolved in favor of the side that offers to the Pathan people the most attractive inducements.

III. BRITISH CONTROL OF THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

When the British took over from the Sikhs in 1849 they succeeded to a frontier administration based upon a vindicitive eye-for-an-eye policy and engaged in perpetual warfare with the Pathan border tribes. Although the British realized the desirability of extending direct control beyond the foothill boundary maintained by the Sikhs they were deterred at first by practical difficulties inherent in the situation. Theoretically, the hill tribes were under the suzerainty of the Amir of Afghanistan but the authority of the Amir was no more recognized than that of the British. It was not until 1893 that the extent of British authority over tribal territory was finally defined when the Durand Boundary Line was negotiated with Afghanistan.

A. Administrative Policy

The administration of the British Punjab authorities, ruling from Lahore until 1901, stopped at the foothills, but tribal depredations forced the British from time to time to send punitive expeditions into the hills, treating the several tribes as independent entities and concluding agreements with them on matters of joint concern.[1] Eventually six districts

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1. A Mahsud treaty was negotiated in 1860, and an agreement with Black Mountain tribes in 1888 and 1891; the Afridi Agreement of 1898 settled the status of the Khyber Pass. Davies, op. cit., pp. 79,118,139.

were demarcated in the settled areas,[1] the deputy commissioner of each being responsible for relations with the tribes adjoining his area. Supervision over a portion of the unsettled tribal area was first extended under the Khyber Agency in 1878, and by 1896 the Malakand, Kurram, and North and South Waziristan Agencies had also been formed. Political Agents maintained liaison between the tribes and provincial authorities, mediated tribal disputes, and directed British policy generally throughout the hills.

Administration of the settled areas was on the same lines as in the rest of India with the exception of concessions granted in recognition of the tribal councils.[2] Tribal movements to and from the hills were allowed and encouraged. A century of direct British administration has produced marked changes in the settled areas. NWFP leaders have actively entered the field of Indian politics and to a large extent the Province rules itself. Even its poorest villages have absorbed some of the assets and liabilities of British-Indian civilization. Except in the more accessible mountain areas, however, the hill Pathans have changed little in the last century. Their predatory activities are somewhat more cautious but their weapons are modern. Migrations and raids into the plains have brought them into contact with Indian civilization, but old habits persist.

In 1901 the North West Frontier was separated from the Punjab and formed into a separate province. The division between settled and independent areas was maintained and defined. The district of Dera Ghazi Khan in the south was ceded to Baluchistan and the Gomal River was accepted as the southern boundary. In the

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1. Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan.
2. Barton, op. cit., p. 58.

north the Dir, Swat, and Chitral (Malakand) Agency, which had previously been directly under the Government of India, was incorporated. Because of the limited authority exercised by the chiefs, each tribe was held collectively responsible for the actions of individual members.

B. Military Policy

British military policy with reference to the Pathan tribesmen may be divided into four phases: the "closed border" policy (1849-1876), the "forward" policy (1876-1899), the "modified closed border" or Curzon policy (1899-1920), and the policy of "peaceful penetration" (1920 to the present).

1. The "Closed Border" Policy. The "closed border" policy was adopted as a reaction to the costly First Afghan War and reflected British alarm at Russian penetration into Central Asia during the first part of the nineteenth century. To counter the savage Pathan hatred carried over from the Sikh regime the British took measures to ensure the defense of the areas newly under their control and then instituted a conciliatory policy toward the inhabitants of the hills. After abolishing the repressive measures of the Sikhs, the British attempted to convey to the tribes a spirit of friendliness and forbearance by establishing the rule of impartial law and by encouraging local trade and commerce. When conciliation failed, penalties by fines were tried, followed by the taking of tribal hostages, and as a last resort, by the application of blockades or punitive measures. Forty expeditions were despatched against the tribes between 1849 and 1878.[1] These methods continued basic to British frontier military policy. With little variation they have persisted to the present day.

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1. Barton, op. cit. p. 59.

2. The "Forward" Policy. It became apparent during the Second Afghan War (1878-80), fought to halt Afghan flirtation with Russia, that the "closed border" system had not succeeded in assimilating, civilizing, or even intimidating the hostile hill tribes. The Viceroy of the day accordingly inaugurated a more aggressive policy in frontier affairs. British statesmen began to talk of establishing a "scientific" frontier from Kabul to Kandahar to ensure control of the western entrances to the border passes.

After the Second Afghan War the British occupied and controlled the Khyber Pass and its tribes. More definite steps to control the border were taken after 1886 when an armed clash occurred between Afghans and Russians at Panjdeh in Transcaspia, halfway between Merv and Herat. Tribal territory adjoining the Kohat district was occupied in 1891 and the British gained rights over unsettled areas on the Hazara border. Meanwhile, the Zhob and Bori country in the vicinity of the Gomal River had been brought under British control, and the Kurram Valley was occupied in 1892 at the request of its Turi (Shiah Muslim) inhabitants.

The Durand demarcation of the Indo-Afghan border in 1893 was interpreted by the tribes as a British move against their independence. The construction of the Peshawar-Chitral road and the establishment of military posts at Wana and in the Tochi Valley in Waziristan in the middle 1890's further aggravated the situation. Tribal resentment over British infiltration tactics, coupled with religious fanaticism, Afghan intrigues, and economic grievances eventually brought on the great tribal conflagration of 1897-98, which spelled the end of the "forward" policy. Military action, heavy road construction and tribal subsidies had yielded meager results, the concentration of troops in the tribal areas had stimulated rather than prevented raids, and the cost

to the Government of India had been staggering.[1]

3. The "Modified Closed Border" or Curzon policy. In 1899 Lord Curzon inaugurated a policy of withdrawing from the tribal territory all British troops except those stationed in Chitral and concentrating them at strategic spots in the settled areas. Instead of troops local tribal levies and militia were employed to police the tribal areas while in the rear roads and light railways were constructed over which the reserves of regular troops could move to any part of the border on short notice. These moves were facilitated when the Government of India took over the responsibility for the defence of the NWFP from the Punjab in 1901. By 1904 the new system was operating successfully from Chitral to the Gomal River.

The Curzon border policy worked fairly satisfactorily until the end of the First World War. The practice of blockading a recalcitrant tribe was supplemented by punitive sallies into the tribes' homeland; the airplane proved particularly effective against the tribesmen. In 1919 the mutiny of the Waziristan militia (which had been entrusted with the maintenance of peace on the border) was the signal for a new Afghan attack in concert with the hill tribes. The Curzon policy was thereupon abandoned.

4. The Policy of "Peaceful Penetration". The new policy of peaceful penetration was designed to open up the unsettled areas to more direct administration on the basis of tribal consent. The army, which had reoccupied a number of strategic points in the independent territory, was divested of all its recruits from that area. Tribal militias were gradually replaced by new local levies called Khassadars and Scouts, who were stationed in districts or agencies other than their own. Village levies were also established

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1. Four and a half million pounds sterling from 1894 to 1899. Davies., op. cit., p. 115.

in the settled areas and the network of roads was extended across the administrative border.

The new policy achieved a high degree of calm, disturbed only by the influx of Indian political agitation. From 1930 to the outbreak of World War II the tribes in the unsettled areas caused little trouble except on periodic occasions when their fanaticism was aroused by anti-British faqirs and pirs (holy men). Since 1936 border unrest has been confined almost entirely to Waziristan, where the Mahsuds and Wazirs have been less inclined to accept British penetration than have other tribes in the Province.

During the early part of World War II German and Italian agents were active in Afghanistan attempting to foment tribal uprisings that would embarrass the British.[1] However, Russia's entry into the war together with renewed pressure from the British on Afghanistan almost entirely negated Axis activities on the frontier. Throughout the war Britain maintained a nervous watchfulness on the border to forestall a general uprising which would hinder the war effort. Troublemakers were quickly and efficiently dealt with.[2] The Afghan Government discouraged tribal raids, a radical departure from its traditional attitude. The tribesmen themselves lacked effective leadership and were also influenced somewhat by British propaganda not to embarrass Britain during a major struggle elsewhere.[3]

Postwar British military policy on the frontier continued

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1. D-8896, Berlin, February 18, 1947; enclosure No. 5.
2. When the Faqir of Ipi attempted in 1944 to arouse the Mahsuds and Wazirs in revolt, the RAF speedily gave him his first taste of 500-pound bombs and harried him into hiding. Since that time he appears to be confining his efforts to sending forth lashkars on tribute-collecting missions. India Command, Monthly Intelligence Summary, No. 20, January 8, 1947, p. 8, para. 26.
3. A-8, New Delhi, January 17, 1945, RESTRICTED.

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on the same lines as in the prewar period. Lawlessness was countered by the usual punitive action, with major dependence on air attack to deter troublemakers. The August 1946 bombing of the Shabi Khel Wazirs may have been the last,[1] as bombing was outlawed by the Interim Government when it assumed power in the following month.

C. Economic Policy

British economic policy on the frontier has operated mainly as a means of control through the issuance or the withholding of money for allowances and employment of army recruits. In recent years increasing attention has been given to removing trade restrictions, protecting caravan traffic, constructing roads into bazaar towns, and irrigating wastelands in the hills.[2] Some medical assistance has also been afforded. Frontier administrators have by and large been too concerned with maintaining order and stability to undertake any long-term agricultural improvement or vocational training.

The system of granting allowances for specific purposes, first used in the pacification of Baluchistan, has been widely employed in the NWFP. The system was used to compensate the tribes for the loss of income previously received as tribute from caravans passing through their areas. In 1881 an allowance was granted to the Afridis for the protection of the Khyber Pass; in 1890 grants were made to the Mahsuds for guarding the Gomal pass; in 1896 the Mohmands were paid allowances in lieu of grants previously allowed them by the Afghan Amir.[3] The British have subsidized picked maliks or leaders on occasion to encourage their loyalty, but with

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1. Hindu, September 14, 1946.
2. Davies, op. cit., p. 23.
3. Ibid., pp. 118, 137-38, 150.

discouraging results. Maliks frequently misrepresented tribal attitudes and sometimes instigated disturbances calculated to demonstrate the need for their services. Unruly tribesmen consider the subsidized maliks to be British agents and disregard their attempts to govern.

The income derived by the tribesmen from recruitment in the Indian Army has played a major part in improving the economic well-being of many of the tribes. Recruits in the settled areas were widely enlisted along with such selected groups in the independent hills as the Orakzais and Yusufzais. Tribesmen also made up the entire strength of the various tribal levies.[1] The British have been able at times to bring effective pressure on recalcitrant tribes by cancelling their enlistment quotas. Regular officers who commanded the tribal militias in the unsettled areas during the recent war were outspoken in their conviction (shared by most of the British provincial administrators) that the solution to the tribal problem did not lie in military action but in a long-term program of withdrawing the Indian army from the frontier, increasing the size of the tribal militias which would benefit the tribes by increased payrolls, and gradually settling the tribes in areas made fertile and liveable by an extensive program of irrigation, reforestration, and agricultural imporvements.[2]

In conformity with the program of drawing up plans for long-term Indian provincial economic development, sponsored by the British in 1944-45, a Planning Commission for the Province has submitted a development program for the six settled districts and requested an allocation of funds by the Government of India.

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1. According to the latest reports, which place the strength of these quasi-military units at over 5,000, the levies are being steadily increased at the same time that the regular Indian Army tactical units are being gradually withdrawal.
2. REF-CID-64802, January 24, 1944.

Indian members of the provincial assembly endeavored without success to extend the scheme beyond the administrative border, presumably because they wished to extend the political control of the assembly to the unsettled areas. When the Congress Party Ministry took over in 1946 a Development Commissioner was authorized to perfect detailed plans which were to have been inaugurated in April 1947.[1] Political events overtook the projected program and no beginning has been made. It nevertheless remains the basic economic policy of the Congress Party administration within the Province.

D. British Policy Regarding Political Movements

Before 1930 the British, for reasons of security, made every effort to curtail local political activity within the Province and barred entry of outside political leaders.[2] Political changes introduced into the neighboring Punjab area, however, inevitably caused repercussions and stimulated political consciousness. By 1930 a Pathan leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, emerged to head an organization capable of resisting repressive measures. To assuage the awakening political discontent and to offset Ghaffar Khan's influence the 1919 dyarchy system of government was extended to the Province in 1932. The NWFP was made a Governor's Province with an advisory Legislative Council of forty members but with strictly limited legislative powers.[3] Under the Act of 1935, which went into effect in April 1937, a legislature of fifty members and a Council of Indian Ministers was introduced with power to act in virtually all fields of government except defense, finance, and

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1. Hindu, October 25, 1946.
2. The reforms in the Minto-Morley Act of 1909 and in the Montagu-Chelmsford Act of 1919 were not extended to the NWFP, but the repressive Rowlatt Act of 1918 was applied.
3. R. Coupland, The Indian Problem (New York, 1944) Part I, pp. 102, 119 ff.

external affairs.[1]

After Ghaffar Khan's Red Shirts won the 1936 elections, the British no longer opposed political movements in the Province and concentrated only on keeping political workers within the settled areas. The popularly elected ministry failed in its efforts to extend its control to tribal affairs.[2]

E. Growth and Character of Indian Political Movements in the Province

The dynamic Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was educated in English mission schools and has devoted his wealth and ability to promoting the cause of frontier independence. He endeavored to cultivate self-help and self-reliance among the Pathans so that social and economic improvement would not depend on the British officials for its execution. He attracted a personal following called the Khudai Khidmatgars (Servants of God), more commonly known as the Red Shirts, who participated in 1930 in the India-wide protest against the Simon Commission Report.[3] His Red Shirts subsequently supported the civil disobedience movement launched by the Congress Party. In spite of predictions to the contrary the Pathan leader persuaded his followers to adopt Gandhi's technique of non-violent resistance and employed it more or less successfully.

The British became so alarmed over the appearance of the Red Shirt movement and the attempted Afridi invasion of Peshawar in 1930 that they arrested Ghaffar Khan, imprisoned him until 1934,

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1. During the recent war the province was ruled dictatorially by the Governor under Section 93 (Act of 1935).

2. Although the Indian members of the Provincial Development Board unanimously condemned the isolation of the independent area, no action was taken and the five-year plan was designed almost exclusively for the settled areas. Hindustan Times, December 21, 1946.

3. The Simon Report, which recommended the devolution of legislative authority from the Government of India to the provinces as a first step toward a federal type of central government, did not advise representative government for the NWFP although the majority of the British India provinces were considered ready for such a reform.

and expelled him from the Province until 1937. In 1937, however, the implementation of the 1935 reforms and the re-entry of Ghaffar Khan brought the frontier once more into the thick of Indian politics. In April 1937 when the provincial Congress Party, in line with the all-India Congress policy, refused to form a ministry even though its provincial leaders had won the elections, a non-Congress ministry was formed under Sir Abdul Quaiyyum, a retired frontier political officer.[1] Meanwhile, the Red Shirts were strengthened and reorganized by Ghaffar Khan. Dr. Khan Sahib, politician brother of Ghaffar Khan, joined in attacking the Quaiyyum ministry and urged the Congress high command to allow him to take the office he had won in the spring elections. When the Congress high command later reversed its tactics in September 1937, a Congress Ministry for the North West Frontier Province was formed with Dr. Khan Sahib as Premier, backed by a clear majority in the legislature.

The Congress Party in the Province is predominantly Muslim. Joint electorates, long since abandoned in the rest of India, continued to be used because the Muslims had no cause to fear proportional representation. The Red Shirt Pathans worked with the Congress because the latter's independence aims coincided with their own, but they originated their own local program of social service and improvement. The visits of Gandhi and Nehru in 1937 and 1938 were greeted with little interest by the Pathans and national Congress leadership generally exercised little influence over the Province.

Notwithstanding M. A. Jinnah's organization after 1938 of the quasi-military "Muslim League Volunteer Corps" in the NWFP, the

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1. R-6, Karachi, May 14, 1941, UNCLASSIFIED section.

political dominance of the Khan brothers remained undisputed until 1945. The League had no strong ground for attacking a provincial Congress Party that was almost as solidly Muslim as the League itself. The idea of fearing Hindu domination was ridiculed by the Pathans. Ghaffar Khan's own independent attitude toward the Congress strengthened his position, and the Provincial Muslim League remained a small body of dissatisfied men attempting to discredit the leadership of the Khan brothers. During the satyagraha (passive resistance) campaign sponsored by the Congress in December 1940 Dr. Khan Sahib and several other leading Congressmen dutifully offered themselves for arrest but were ignored by the police.

The Congress Party's decision in 1942 to give up office in the N.W.F.P left a political vacuum which was eventually filled by the Governor's appointment of Sardar Aurangzeb Khan to form a ministry willing to cooperate in the war effort. The Aurangzeb ministry was composed primarily of office-holders who lacking both program and following of their own associated themselves with the Muslim League largely because they wanted to attach themselves to an organized political party. The political prestige of office and the power of appointment enabled the League to develop some strength in the Province, though it remained a minor party primarily because the League high command was more concerned with other matters and its provincial organization lacked funds and leadership.

Despite the absence of its leaders, the Congress Party in the N.W.F.P was able to reassert its claim to control the Government by winning a by-election in early 1944. Gandhi's release from prison later in 1944 stimulated reorganization activities and the Red Shirts began voicing their impatience at being restrained from challenging the corrupt Aurangzeb government. Graft and corruption permeated the League's frontier administration from top to bottom

and so weakened the Aurangzeb ministry that it fell on March 15, 1945 after a no-confidence vote. Dr. Khan Sahib was sworn in as Premier of a Congress Party ministry on the following day.[1]

The establishment of a Congress ministry in the NWFP contributed to breaking the all-India deadlock between the Government of India and the Congress. Party leaders who were free became convinced that they should endeavor to recapture political offices elsewhere in preparation for the postwar situation. The nationalist press hailed it as a long deferred revival of the Congress and an indictment of the Pakistan concept.[2] The Muslim League press, on the other hand, termed the Khan victory merely a rebuke of unpopular leaders and not a repudiation of the idea of Pakistan,[3] pointing out that the Aurangzeb ministry had won by elections by clearly supporting Pakistan.[4] The Government and British press welcomed it as a return to constitutional practices and to cooperation in the war effort.[5]

The ousted Muslim League leaders, anxious to regain power, solicited Muslim support for the Muslim party and attacked Hindu influence in the Congress ministry in the person of the Hindu Finance Member. With a view to building a disciplined organization on a par with the Congress, the League began to train provincial followers.

Differences developed in the Congress ranks when Ghaffar Khan, always more uncompromisingly anti-British than his brother, indicated that he was not pleased at the formation of the ministry

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1. B-1052, New Delhi, March 13, 1945, RESTRICTED: D-1063, New Delhi, March 16, 1945, RESTRICTED.
2. Hindustan Standard, March 17, 1945; Free Press Journal, March 16 and 19, 1945.
3. Dawn, March 17, 1945, Eastern Times, March 16, 1945.
4. Dawn, March 17, 1947.
5. Times of India, March 16, 1945; Statesman, March 17, 1945; Capital, March 22, 1945.

and objected because his release had been a bargaining point in its formation.[1] Nevertheless, he and thousands of his Red Shirts as well as independent tribesmen attended the Congress's Frontier political conference held in Pehsawar April 21 to 23[2] where the reversal of the Congress policy of non-participation was defended. Dr. Syed Mahmud, Congress Working Committee member who presided, said that the Congress intended to prove to the Pathans that it was not, like the League, an obstacle to India's freedom but rather a participant in the fight for independence. Resolutions were approved condemning the air bombing of the independent tribes and urging the Provincial Government to appoint a committee to report on the industrial, agricultural, mineral, and irrigation resources of the Province and to implement this committee's recommendations for development projects.[3]

During the summer of 1945 tension increased not only between the two major political parties but between the Congress Party and the British. The British were concerned to maintain stability among the tribes in the midst of an explosive situation and they were suspicious of the Red Shirts and Ghaffar Khan who had been active among the tribes in the past.[4] The fall of 1945 saw both Indian parties preparing campaigns for the general elections to be held at the beginning of the following year. Ghaffar Khan, intent on his program of social reform, refrained from entering

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1. One of the provisos in the formation of the ministry was Ghaffar Khan's release from prison, D-10, New Delhi, April 20, 1945, RESTRICTED.
2. D-81, New Delhi, May 31, 1945, CONFIDENTIAL.
3. D-24, New Delhi, April 25, 1945, RESTRICTED.
4. In late July, for example, when Ghaffar Khan attempted to visit Attock in the Punjab he was promptly restrained by the Punjab authorities who assumed he was about to make political speeches. Tension built up rapidly as his Red Shirt followers flocked down from the frontier demanding his release and only when Ghaffar Khan decided to turn back did the situation become less strained. D-174, New Delhi, July 31, 1945, CONFIDENTIAL.

into the political wrangle, but he allowed his Red Shirts to support the Congress campaign.

When the returns of the January-February 1946 elections were complete the Congress had won a clear majority, capturing 19 of 36 Muslim seats, 2 of 3 Sikh, and all 9 General seats.[1] The League demonstrated its increased strength by capturing the remaining 17 Muslim seats. The Congress promptly called the victory certain indication that the frontier Muslims regarded the Congress rather than the League as guardians of their interests.

IV. PROBLEMS OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL

The question of the future of the North West Frontier Province became urgent following the British Government's announcement on May 16, 1946, that it intended to transfer all governing power in India to Indian hands. Congress leaders have long been suspicious that the British intended to retain some control over the frontier area even after Indians gained control over foreign affairs (including tribal affairs) and defense, both of which involved the NWFP. The Muslim League, however, is interested in extending its influence over all Muslim majority areas and in eliminating Congress influence from the NWFP. The basic British interest lies in accomplishing a peaceful transfer of power in a fashion designed to promote future cooperation with Indians in matters of defense, but to do this without jeopardizing effective control over the tribal territory before the powers of government are actually transferred. After nearly a century of control the British have only partially solved the problems of the Indo-Afghan border apart from maintaining security; they can scarcely view with optimism the transfer of these problems to Indian management under conditions where the inherent

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1. One Sikh and the two Special Interest seats were won by Independents.

difficulties are aggravated by intense political rivalry and communal strife.

A. The Cabinet Mission Plan

The British plan of May 16, 1946, affected the NWFP in two ways: first as a province which had the right to participate in the Constituent Assembly and in the regional grouping plan, and second, as a territory containing tribal and excluded areas which fell within the scope of the responsibility of the Assembly's Advisory Committee. The Province exclusive of the tribal areas was authorized to send three representatives to the Constituent Assembly where they were to collaborate in Group "B" with representatives of Sind and the Punjab in drawing up constitutions for the three provinces and, if feasible, a group constitution as well. The Plan explicitly provided (item 19, sub-clause 8) that as soon as the new constitutional arrangements came into effect, any province could elect to opt out of the group in which it had been placed. The British issued a statement following the London talks of December 1946, reaffirming that no constitution would be forced on any unwilling state or part of a state. The decision to participate in the all-India constitutional efforts remained with the Provincial Assembly.

The Congress Party won control of two of the three NWFP seats in the Constituent Assembly and the two delegates participated in the Assembly when it convened on December 9, 1946.

B. Policies and Activities in the NWFP

1. Congress Policy and Activity. In 1939, the Congress Party supported a resolution advanced by Asaf Ali recommending that the Government of India implement a revision of frontier policy by:

(a) Ceasing to interfere with the affairs of the Independent Tribal Territory;

(b) Withdrawing to the border of the administered districts

of the North West Frontier Province;

(c) Allowing the population of the administered tribal belt the right of self determination;

(d) Concluding treaties of peace and defensive alliances with the Chiefs of Independent Territory, treating it on the same basis as the independent territory of Nepal; and

(e) Taking necessary steps to transfer the management of the affairs of the tribal belt of the Northwest Frontier Province from the External Affairs Department to the Provincial Government and providing the necessary funds for the purpose.[1]

However, the war cut short Congress Party efforts to remove the NWFP from exclusive British control.

a. Reaction to the Cabinet Mission Plan. The Cabinet Mission Plan, though generally considered favorably by the Congress press, was promptly and firmly condemned by the NWFP Congress Party. It objected particularly to the proposal to group the Province with the Punjab in Group "B" on the grounds that the Pathans would reject any scheme of compulsory grouping. Their spokesman asserted that the Province would, at any rate, be certain to opt out whenever new elections were held.[2] Derisive rejoinders on the part of the League to the "Punjab bogey" which was frightening the Province only served to increase tension between the two parties. Ghaffar Khan toured the Province warning his audiences of the danger of their domination by the Punjab Muslims if the Plan were accepted and the League hurriedly inaugurated counter campaigns against him.[3]

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1. D-107, Kabul, February 10, 1943, CONFIDENTIAL.
2. Hindustan Times, June 6, 1946.
3. Khyber Mail, June 21, 1946. In answer to Congress charges that large quantities of rifles, pistols, and knives were being manufactured in the Kohat Pass rifle factory for shipment to those areas in India where Muslims were in the minority, the League raised counter-charges that the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (a militant anti-Muslim organization) was silently working in Peshawar and had opened eight training centers in the city. Khyber Mail, July 26, 1946.

The Interim Indian Government which took office on Setpember 2, 1946 was at the outset a Congress government. One of Pandit Nehru's first acts as Member for External Affairs (which included tribal affairs) was to abolish air bombing on the frontier. On September 26, Nehru reaffirmed the importance of promoting the security and well-being of the tribal areas, and declared that the Interim Government had no intention of depriving the tribes of their existing freedom or of coercing them in any way. The Government's approach, he said, would be a friendly one, designed to work in cooperation with the tribes toward a solution of economic difficulties and to bring them into a "mutually beneficial association with their neighbors in settled districts." No moves would be made, however, without giving fullest consideration to Indian obligations to Afghanistan.[1]

Nehru's subsequent indication of his intention to visit the frontier in order to make a first-hand survey of its problems brought forth conflicting comments from Congress Party and League sympathizers in the Province. Ghaffar Khan and his brother assured Nehru that the tribesmen would welcome him as the leader of the Indian independence movement, while the provincial League, headed by Abdul Qayyum, strongly disapproved of the proposed visit as provocative of a "most unsettling effect on the Province."[2]

b. Nehru's October Visit. From October 16 to 23 Pandit Nehru and the Khan brothers made an extensive tour of the tribal areas, which brought into sharp focus the two-party conflict in the Province. The League opposed the tour with its entire strength. A few days before Nehru's arrival the foremost League leader in the

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1. Government of India Information Service Cable, No. 3250, September 27, 1946.
2. Dawn, October 16, 1946.

tribal areas, the Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif, travelled over 600 miles of tribal territory to muster opposition to the impending visit.[1] League volunteers gathered to discredit Nehru's reception at Peshawar, and Dawn, the League's official newspaper, sent a special correspondent to cover the event. On Nehru's arrival, over 5,000 Muslim League volunteers clad in green uniforms demonstrated against him.[2] Immediately Ghaffar Khan charged that the demonstrations were made with the consent and cooperation of the British Political Department.[3]

The Congress leader's tour took him through Waziristan, the Khyber Pass area, and into the Malakand Agency. Except at one stop in Waziristan his presence was received with hostility by the tribesmen who had been assembled in jirgah by the Political Agents for the area. Only at Jandola in South Waziristan and later at the Red Shirt training camp at Sardaryab did Nehru meet with cordiality and interest. Nehru's speeches to the tribesmen were designed to promote cooperation and mutual trust, but his effort was not reciprocated.

The outcome of the tour evoked widely divergent interpretations from the Congress and League press. The League insisted that the Pathans wanted only Pakistan, that Nehru had been warned of possible hostility on the part of the tribesmen toward the representative of a Hindu government, and that the Political Department could not have been behind the unpleasantness because Nehru supposedly controlled that Department. The Congress press pointed out, in reply, that the receptions were hostile only where the

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1. Dawn, October 23, 1946.
2. Hindu, October 17, 1946.
3. Merchand Khanna, the Hindu Finance Minister of the NWFP, claimed that the Muslim League knew of Nehru's itinery even when the Provincial Assembly did not, thus supporting Ghaffar Khan's contention. Hindu, October 17, 1946.

Political Agents had called out their jirgahs, and that the British frontier administrators, who had thus prevented the truly independent Pathans from meeting the tourists, were not Labor Government men but carry-overs from the hostile Tory regime.[1] It insisted, furthermore, that Nehru deserved no such treatment because he had stopped the use of aerial bombing and had committed the Interim Government to a program of improving tribal welfare.

Three reasons emerge for the negative tribal reaction: (1) the natural suspicion with which the tribesmen view any Hindu politician, (2) the substantial extension in the size and influence of the League in the Province, and (3) the efforts on the part of local British administrators to maintain their hold over the tribes by discrediting Indian nationalists. When Nehru returned to Delhi he declared that he anticipated determined opposition by "vested interests of the Frontier" to any change of frontier policy.[2] Congress leaders, obviously caught napping by the unexpected development of a new League front in the tribal areas, condemned the League for presenting the alternatives of surrender ro the League or civil war, which would only afford opportunity for the British to reassert their domination.[3]

c. The Viceroy's November Visit to the Frontier Province. On November 15, 1946, during his tour of the tribal areas, Lord Wavell told the tribal jirgahs[4] that the freedom of the Pathan tribesmen, their most precious possession guaranteed under treaties made with the British, would be maintained and not be arbitrarily entrusted

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1. When Congress deputies spoke of a letter of welcome from the Faqir of Ipi to Nehru (Hindu, October 18, 1946), the League denounced it as a Congress machination (Dawn, October 28, 1946).
2. Hindu, October 23, 1946.
3. Hindu, October 25, 1946.
4. Hindu, November 17, 1946; Hindustan Times, November 18, 1946.

contrast between Nehru's message of friendship being greeted with stones and the Viceroy who represented British domination being met with enthusiasm.[1] The Hindu of Madras attacked traditional British policies of subsidization, punitive military action, emphasis on defensive over constructive action, and the assignment of conservative Residents and Political Agents in the tribal areas. It outlined a four-point program (1) to facilitate the free movement of people to and from the tribal area, (2) to establish direct diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and correlate the Indian and Afghan frontier policies, (3) to replace the old system of Malik (headman) subsidization, using these funds for schools, hospitals, and other social service activities, and (4) to transfer the entire function of the British tribal administration to the popular provincial ministry.[2] Although the Governor of the NWFP disallowed an Assembly resolution of early November calling for the end of the dual administrative system,[3] the Congress government continued to condemn it.[4]

Concurrent with the effort of the Constituent Assembly's Advisory Committee to recommend schemes for the administration of the frontier tribal areas,[5] the Interim Government made a number of decisions in its frontier policy. It declined to permit aerial bombing of the tribes responsible for the Hazara disturbances in December[6] although it did impose fines in the usual manner.[7] It projected impressive plans for social and economic development

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1. Hindu, November 20, 1946; Hindustan Times, November 21, 1946.
2. Hindu, November 21, 1946.
3. Ibid., November 11, 1946.
4. Hindustan Times, December 21, 1946; Hindu, December 21 and 27, 1946.
5. Government of India Information Cable No. 901, January 27, 1947.
6. FBIB, February 3, 1947.
7. Hindu, January 9, 1947; Hindustan Times, March 5, 1947.

to any Indian political party. They would be forewarned, he added, when the time came for their old agreements with the British to be replaced by new agreements negotiated with the future Government of India.

Khyber Agency tribes in reply declared that their treaties were with the British Government and in the event the British left India the tribes would request that the Pass be returned to them as original owners. They repudiated the idea of affiliation with the Interim Government, charging that it could not be an all-India government until Hindu-Muslim differences were amicably settled. They also asked the Viceroy for increased allowances and for the remission of fines levied because of an incident in the Khyber Pass which had occurred during Pandit Nehru's October visit to the area.

The Viceroy insisted that the Khyber Pass was an international highway and that the tribes would want to make suitable arrangements to keep it open in the future as they had done in the past. He denied their request for remission of fines charging that the tribes had in fact perpetrated a grave breach of their 1898 treaty with the British. He explained that allowances would not be raised because such money as was available would be used in developing the prosperity of the entire country. The Viceroy's speech was a firm reminder to the tribal chiefs that Britain still maintained suzerainty over the frontier and that she would continue to do so until withdrawal was complete. Coming as it did immediately after Pandit Nehru's visit in October, the visit counteracted any suggestions from Indian politicians that the tribal areas were already an exclusively Indian affair.

d. Increased Interest by Congress in Frontier affairs. The Congress press became increasingly vocal about frontier affairs. Every move in the Province was reported. Ghaffar Khan summarized Congress reaction by blaming the Political Department for the

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which applied to the Province as an integrated unit.[1] It got the Governor of the Province to agree to consult the Frontier Ministry more frequently, and the Commander in Chief of India to announce that a program for replacing the regular troops in the trans-border areas with bodies of local militia would be undertaken. Nehru announced on March 1 that henceforth the Political Agents would allow entry of political workers into tribal areas but warned party workers that the Government was not responsible for their safety unless they first consulted the Political Agent concerned and subsequently kept on protected roads.[2]

2. League Policy and Activity. The Muslim League's initial objective in its frontier campaign was to dispel Pathan fears of Punjab domination and to furnish substantial proof that the Pathans, although perhaps not solidly behind the League, were sufficiently divided to warrant holding a referendum. As early as June, 1946 Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, provincial Muslim League leader, argued that the Frontier Province as part of Pakistan would not be dominated by the Punjab, and that the Group "B" (Pakistan) government, the structure of which was not explained, would administer only such departments as "will be snatched from the present Centre." He insisted that the interests of the Pathans would be protected and the NWFP would have a real say in the Pakistan government.[3] The League espoused no specific measures as did the Congress, but merely promoted the Pakistan concept and condemned the Congress. During the late summer the League claimed that the political views of the Pathans had changed since the general elections at the beginning of the year and began demanding that a referendum

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1. Hindu, January 9, 1947.
2. Indian Information, Vol, 20, No. 203, March 1, 1947, p. 196.
3. Khyber Mail, June 14, 1946.

be held on the issue of Pakistan.[1]

League propaganda in the tribal areas steadily gained ground in late 1946. During Nehru's visit in October, Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif was placed in charge of League propaganda among the tribesmen.[2] At a meeting of the provincial League in early November tribal representatives of the Mahsuds, Wazirs, Bhittanis, and Daurs in attendance were told that mass murders of Muslims by Hindus was going on in Bihar province.[3] A contingent of several hundred League National Guards who were sent in December to aid the "oppressed Muslims of Bihar" apparently included tribal volunteers.[4] Pir Sahib's efforts even included the leading of a party to see the Faqir of Ipi. He returned to New Delhi in mid-December with assurances that the frontier would support Pakistan.[5] In reply to the insistence of the frontier Congress Party that the Pathans could never be forced to join in any group against their wishes,[6] League frontier leaders repeated the League's challenge to hold a referendum on the issue of Pakistan.[7] Congress leaders, however, argued that in the general elections of 1946 the Pathans had in fact returned a verdict against Pakistan.[8]

3. Tribal Reaction and Activity. The unsettling effect upon the tribesmen of continued aggressive agitation by rival Indian parties had long been foreseen by British and Indian observers. It was demonstrated in early December when two villages in the Hazara district were raided by nearby tribesmen.[9] The military required

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1. Dawn, September 23, 1946.
2. Dawn, October 16, 1946.
3. India Command, Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 19, December 2, 1946.
4. Dawn, December 17, 1946.
5. Ibid., December 17 and 19, 1946.
6. Hindustan Times, December 17, 1946; Hindu, December 21, 1946.
7. Hindu, December 25, 1946.
8. Ibid., December 26, 1946.
9. Ibid., December 10, 1946.

a month to bring the situation under control. Local villagers became involved; Hindu and Sikh residents fled to Kashmir and the Punjab.[1] League and Congress representatives eventually toured the area appealing for peace.[2]

Both sides affirmed that the trouble was non-communal, but each blamed the propaganda of the other faction.[3] The increasing clamor of Indian politicians on the frontier had apparently persuaded the tribesmen, whose resources were depleted by a hard winter, that the British Raj had become too weak to guard the border and that the time was ripe to challenge the authority of the new Indian Raj. Muslim League propaganda that Hindus were murdering Muslims in Bihar and Bombay may also have influenced the tribesmen to attempt retaliation against the Hazara minorities, who were in some instances the particular objects of attack.

However interpreted, the incident was ominous. British observers doubted if either League or Congress agitators realized that it was far easier to arouse popular passions than to direct their course.[4] Regardless of party claims, the majority of the tribesmen stressed that they wanted no part in Indian politics.[5] The Faqir of Ipi issued "directives" throughout the southern portion of the tribal area emphasizing that the tribes would remain neutral from Indian political parties but would be willing to come to terms with an accredited Indian ambassador after the British departed.[6]

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1. Hindustan Times, December 16, 1946; Hindu, January 9, 1947; Dawn, January 13, 1947.
2. Dawn, December 24, 1946; Hindu, December 14, 1946; January 9, 1947.
3. Dawn, January 13, 1947; D-3215, Delhi, January 9, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL.
4. London Times, March 19, 1947.
5. Hindustan Times, March 7, 1947; Bombay Chronicle, March 3, 1947; D-1039, New Delhi, April 8, 1947, RESTRICTED.
6. Bombay Chronicle, March 7 and 8, 1947; Hindustan Times, March 7, 1947.

The independent viewpoint of the tribesmen can be illustrated by the Faqir of Ipi's rejection of overtures both from Pir Sahib on the part of the League in November 1946, and later from a Congress Red Shirt mission in mid-December. The Congress group apparently succeeded in gaining access to the Faqir himself, but the latter refused to have anything to do with Indian politics and warned all Congress sympathizers in Waziristan to remain aloof.[1] Nehru summed up the Interim Government's attitude toward this controversial figure by stating that the Government had no fued with the Faqir and would welcome friendly relations with him.[2]

4. Activities of Local British Officials. Tribal inquiries concerning independence and possible future ties with Afghanistan have uniformly been interpreted by Congress spokesmen as reflecting the influence of conservative local British officials who would like to retain British control of the area. This interpretation is supported by the confidential comments of some of these officials who stress the importance of this border area to British Empire defense against the USSR and argue that prospective chaos in India makes unlikely effective control of the border from the Indian side. If this border figures in future British Empire defense, direct British relations with the tribal area could be perpetuated either by treating the area as independent from the rest of India or by regarding it as part of a dominion of Pakistan. Should the Pathans and Pakistan refuse to cooperate in a British defense scheme, the only British alternative would be a defense agreement with Afghanistan.

Congress India is certain to want to be consulted it not to

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1. India Command, Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 20, January 8, 1947.
2. Hindustan Times, November 2, 1946.

participate in frontier defence, and even Pakistan would probably oppose continued British control unless the Muslim League can continue to extend its own influence in the tribal area. It is possible that Afghanistan is sufficiently desirous of British support against prospective Soviet encroachments to agree to a special frontier defense arrangement as an adjunct to the British program of military aid and equipment to Afghanistan. A British arrangement with Afghanistan apart from India would involve the development of an alternative route into Afghanistan. Whatever local British authorities may do, however, the current British official policy is clearly to promote necessary negotiation between the tribes and the successor authority or authorities in India.

C. Subsequent Developments

1. Prime Minister Attlee's February 1947 Statement. On February 20, 1947, Mr. Attlee announced in the House of Commons that by June 1948 the full transfer of power from British to responsible Indian hands would be effected. The statement emphasized that the British Government desired to transfer its responsibility in accordance with the Cabinet Mission's Plan but would in any case transfer it by June 1948 "whether as a whole to some form of Central Government for British India, or in some areas to the existing Provincial Governments, or in such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people."[1]

By this statement the British were apparently offering to recognize one of three eventualities in regard to the provinces of India: (1) membership in an all-India union, (2) incorporation into a regional Congress India or Pakistan state, or (3) provincial autonomy, presumably with freedom to join or remain outside of any

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1. "Transference of Powers by June 1948"; Indian Information, Vol. 20, No. 203, March 1, 1947, p. 177.

larger group of provinces. For the North West Frontier Province the third choice was particularly significant inasmuch as Muslim Leaguers were rebelling against the frontier Congress ministry in an attempt to force the province into Pakistan. The announcement committed Britain to evacuate even those frontier areas over which it had maintained exclusive control. The suspicions of Congress leaders of the NWFP were not allayed, however, in view of press reports that the British Government was negotiating with the Government of India for the establishment of an armament practice camp in the Province for use by the RAF. An armed forces' headquarters communiqué promptly denied that the alleged negotiations were being carried on and pointed out that the Government of India had received no such proposal.[1] A few days later speculation was revived when the military began surveying for a direct Karachi-Quetta railway and highway, a move interpreted as part of a British plan for developing bases in Baluchistan and Waziristan.

2. League Campaign in the NWFP. Prime Minister Attlee's February statement took the leaders of both Indian parties by surprise. Congress leaders were jubilant over the prospect of freedom but dismayed at the possibility of civil war and the probable establishment of Pakistan. The League determined to intensify its efforts for control of Muslim areas. As unity was no longer a condition of British withdrawal, the disputed areas in the northeast and northwest henceforth demanded the full attention of both parties in a final struggle for superiority.[2]

The League unable to defeat the Punjab and NWFP ministries in the assemblies began to agitate in behalf of "civil liberties,"

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1. FBIB, Daily, March 14, 1947.
2. D-1393, Karachi, March 3, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL.

protesting the Punjab Ministry's ban on "private armies"[1] and the NWFP Ministry's emergency public safety ordinance in the Hazara district. The principal political objectives were to discredit the existing coalition and Congress ministries in those two crucial provinces. Although the League succeeded in forcing the resignation of the coalition ministry in the Punjab, the party was unable to form a new ministry and its defiant attitude completely alienated the Hindu and Sikh communities. Communal riots in the Punjab early in March resulted in thousands killed and seriously injured and scores of villages burned or plundered.[2]

On February 19, disturbances which arose in the NWFP as the result of a League procession in Mardan prompted Dr. Khan Sahib to impose a ban on parades and meetings in the Mardan district. Two days later, the ban was extended to Peshawar after a group of League leaders forced an entry into Dr. Khan Sahib's home.[3] The provincial League thereupon defied the ban under the "civil liberties" slogan and the Frontier Government retaliated by arresting the League's provincial leader, Abdul Qayyum Khan. League agitation became even more intense after Attlee's statement of February 20, and after the provincial League members learned of their co-workers success in forcing out the coalition ministry in the Punjab. The Provincial Government, made nervous by events in the Punjab, continued its firm policy by extending the ban to the Kohat district early in March.

The Red Shirts finally determined to counter the work of the League by an organized propaganda drive of their own in the rural areas.[4] By the middle of March their delegations were touring

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1. These "private armies" included the League's National Guards and a larger Hindu organization known as the Rashtriya Sewakswayam Sangha. New York Times, January 25, 1947.
2. New York Times, March 16, 1947.
3. Hindustan Times, March 4, 1947.
4. Ibid., March 7, 1947.

the affected areas preaching "communal harmony and brotherhood," and comdemning the League's tactics as "undemocratic and reactionary."[1] Congress leaders reaffirmed the popularity of their ministry and attacked the League's hate propaganda for destroying communal stability.[2] They said that the Act of 1935 allowed them to stay in office for five years but that, since the British were leaving in June 1948, they would naturally stand by the verdict of the first elections held after the new constitution became effective. Until that time the popular Red Shirt government would stay in power.[3] This negative appeal, however, could not match the enthusiasm of Pakistan partisans.

During March and April the number of Leaguers arrested grew into the thousands. League leaders urged Dr. Khan Sahib to resign as had the Punjab premier,[4] but the Frontier leader insisted that he had the backing of the majority of the Pathans and called on the League to dispute his leadership legally or face the consequences of their unconstitutional activities.[5] On March 9 a huge gathering of League demonstrators blocked a mail train at Peshawar and dispersed only when fired on by the police.[6] The Peshawar occurrence was followed by a series of violent attacks on non-Muslims, indicative of the increasingly communal nature of the agitation. Stabbings became frequent; churches were burned; and the death toll rose rapidly in spite of curfews being enforced in Peshawar and other frontier towns.

On March 19, 1947, over two thousand Red Shirts entered Peshawar to "restore confidence" among the forty thousand Hindus

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1. Hindustan Times, March 14 and 17, 1947.
2. Ibid., March 17, 18, 19 and 20, 1947.
3. Ibid., March 18 and 21, 1947.
4. Dawn, March 5, 1947.
5. Hindustan Times, March 7, 11, 18, 1947.
6. New York Times, March 13, 1947.

and Sikhs of the city and to aid the police in maintaining order.[1] Although strongly denying any connection with the movement, the Government welcomed it as a means of regaining communal peace[2] and Congress leaders claimed that harmony was soon restored in spite of a League hartal (closed shop) order.[3]

Sporadic clashes during the latter part of March culminated in the arrest of the Pir Sahib himself,[4] but the League continued its agitation. Tribesmen were persuaded to participate in League demonstrations[5] and to declare before witnesses their desire for Pakistan. Although outbursts during the first weeks of April were followed by a few days of comparative quiet, the middle of the month again brought serious communal rioting in the southern part of the Province.[6]

The New Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, eventually called Dr. Khan Sahib, Pandit Nehru, and Sir Olaf Caroe, Governor of the Province, to a conference in Delhi for the purpose of drafting a plan to ease the tension.[7] News of the conference brought varied responses from the Congress and the League. The Congress saw in the conference an indication that the powers of the Governor in the

1. New York Times, March 20, 1947; T-194, New Delhi, March 22, 1947, RESTRICTED.
2. Hindustan Times, March 20, 1947. It is claimed that Dr. Khan Sahib engineered the "invasion" to demonstrate his power. REF-CIG-SO-4722, March 31, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL.
3. Hindustan Times, March 22, 1947.
4. London Times, March 29, 1947.
5. Dawn, March 4, 11, 16, and 18, April 3, 4, 15 and 16, 1947. T-210, New Delhi, March 31, 1947, RESTRICTED.
6. Dawn, April 17, 1947; Hindustan Times, April 16 and 19, 1947; New York Times, April 19, 1947. The towns of Dera Ismail Khan and Tank were looted and fires started by the rioters got out of control with serious damage resulting. Many of the numerous casualties were inflicted by troops sent to enforce the curfews.
7. Hindustan Times, April 19, 1947.

tribal areas would be largely transferred to the Khan ministry and demanded that League agitation end. The League, on the other hand, maintained that the conference had been called to settle the differences between the premier, whom they charged with being guilty of extreme repression and the Governor, who was said to favor a reference to the electorate. The League press commented that the Viceroy knew that peace could be restored in the Province only by dismissing the Congress Ministry, releasing all those arrested during the League movement, and holding fresh elections.[1]

On April 19 as a result of the conference, the Frontier Government granted an amnesty to all political prisoners not charged with acts of violence.[2] The decision was made, Dr. Khan Sahib explained, in response to the joint Gandhi-Jinnah peace appeal and with the hope that the move would inspire mutual goodwill and understanding.[3] The Frontier Congress still claimed popular support and was obdurate on the issue of new elections, in spite of the fact that by that time the Congress high command had apparently agreed to accept the idea of Pakistan.[4] Peace seemed as distant as ever. The League reiterated its demands for the overthrow of the Congress Ministry,[5] and League President Jinnah himself eventually endorsed the continuation of the civil disobedience movement.[6] The League's "Volunteer Army" reportedly paraded through Peshawar streets in May "armed with rifles, revolvers and double-barrelled shotguns," and Leaguers allegedly dynamited a frontier road bridge and damaged a courtroom in Mardan.[7]

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1. Dawn, April 19, 1947.
2. New York Times, April 21, 1947.
3. Hindustan Times, April 22, 1947.
4. FBIB, April 29, 1947; T-303, New Delhi, May 3, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL.
5. New York Times, April 23, 1947.
6. Hindustan Times, May 8, 1947.
7. New York Times, May 26, 1947.

After the demonstrated popularity of League slogans in the N.FP and the issuance of the "directive" by the Faqir of Ipi in early April stressing tribal neutrality and independence, the Khan brothers adopted a new line of appeal to the Pathans. They began to stress the unity of the "independent Pathan nation", which would endeavor to "negotiate on equal footing either with Hindustan or Pakistan whichever offers ... the best terms."[1] They indicated furthermore that, despite their opposition to being forcibly grouped with the Punjab, they were not averse to seeing the Hazara district join the Punjab since "the people of Hazara speak the same language and have the same customs as the Punjabis."[2] This attempt to counter the League appeals to the Pathan's religious fanaticism by an appeal to his antagonism to all non-Pathan control was further reinforced by the formation on May 8, 1947 of a Red Shirt youth organization -- the Zulma Pakhtoon -- under the leadership of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's son, Khan Abdul Ghani Khan. This organization was designed to defend by force the innocent people of the frontier, especially the minorities, from the violence initiated by the League.[3]

3. British Statement of June 3, 1947. The British White Paper of June 3, announcing the partition of India into Congress India and Pakistan, called for a referendum among the electorate of the NWFP to ascertain which Constituent Assembly the Province would join.[4] The Paper indicated Britain's determination, on the basis of the Viceroy's discussions and observations, to implement withdrawal as quickly as possible even well before June 1948. The British were convinced that a referendum was necessary to settle the question of the popular support of the Congress Ministry in the NWFP,

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1. Hindustan Times, May 14, 1947.
2. Ibid., May 12, 1947.
3. Ibid., May 8, 1947.
4. New York Times, June 4, 1947.

especially as the Province would be isolated from the Congress-dominated area of India if the adjacent Punjab voted to join Pakistan. The Paper also provided that the tribes in the unsettled areas would have to negotiate new treaties with whatever Indian authority succeeded the British in the Province.

4. Reaction. Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh leaders reluctantly admitted that the White Paper seemed the only possible solution to India's difficulties.[1] The Muslim League called off its "civil disobedience" campaign, satisfied with the proposed referendum on the issue of joining Pakistan or Congress India. Provincial Leaguers, on being released from jail, directed their energies toward the rural areas in an effort to acquaint the populace with the terms of the referendum and to urge the acceptance of Pakistan.[2]

The provincial Congress Party adopted new tactics, recognizing that their attachment to the predominately Hindu Congress Party weakened any reasoned arguments against Pakistan with its emotional religious appeal. During the second week of May the Red Shirts began to call for the establishment of an independent sovereign Pathan state, not to be dominated by either Congress India or Pakistan.[3] During May this new idea gained considerable impetus,[4] at first as an attempt to demonstrate that the ministry was essentially pro-Pathan, and later to promote "Pathanistan" as a direct counter to the League's Pakistan.[5] The provincial Congress attacked the

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1. New York Times, June 4, 1947.
2. Dawn, June 9, 1947.
3. Hindustan Times, May 12 and 14, 1947.
4. Ibid., May 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, and 28, 1947. Ghaffar Khan argued that an independent Pathanistan could bargain for satisfactory terms from either Congress India or Pakistan.
5. Merchand Khanna, Frontier Finance Minister, actually began outlining the economic position of the proposed Pathanistan. (Hindustan Times, May 21 and 22, 1947). Others visualized the formation of a "socialist" state under the joint administration of the Khan ministry and the Faqir of Ipi for the settled and unsettled areas respectively with the Red Shirts forming the nucleus for the Pathan army. (Hindustan Times, May 28, 1947.)

referendum on the grounds that it had been forced by perpetration of League violence in the province,[1] and could not fairly register popular opinion when held in an atmosphere of communal agitation and unrest. They argued that the choice provided by the referendum should not be between Congress India and Pakistan, but between Pakistan and an independent Pathanistan. The League replied by pointing out that Congress Leaders themselves had condemned the declarations of independence by the princely states.[2] Nevertheless, during the latter part of June Ghaffar Khan, with the apparent acquiescence of the Congress high command, openly supported the Pathanistan idea.[3]

On June 25, Ghaffar Khan announced his party's decision to boycott the referendum entirely,[4] observing that he would not object to one if the issue were between Pakistan and Pathanistan. Presumably the frontier leader expects to maintain the strength of his party by avoiding commitment for or against Pakistan, intending to win out in the next provincial legislative elections on the issue of complete freedom for the Pathans. Such a maneuver, if successful, would place the NWFP in the unique position of having joined Pakistan while being administered by supporters of an independent Pathan state. The legal basis of the move might be disputed, but Ghaffar Khan's popular position would be strong. If he successfully contests the next provincial legislative elections on the issue of Pathanistan and decides to opt out of Pakistan and the League will face great difficulties in reasserting its hold on the province. The

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1. Hindustan Times, June 6, 1947.
2. New York Times, June 20, 1947.
3. Ibid., June 23, 24, and 26, 1947. Nehru was reported to have supported the movement and Gandhi openly lent his support. However, it is unlikely that the Congress high command would associate themselves officially with a movement which could set a pattern for Muslim League retaliation within Congress India.
4. Ibid., June 26, 1947.

popular appeal of an independent Pathan state if divorced from Congress affiliations would more than counter the appeal of Pakistan particularly in view of the Pathan age-old antipathy for outside rule. If union with Pakistan is unavoidable, Ghaffar Khan can still use the Pathanistan issue as a means of maintaining his personal influence. The situation, however, might also afford opportunity for Afghan authorities to fish in troubled waters.

Jinnah has attacked the NWFP Congress Party for its advocacy of an "independent Pathanistan," charging that Ghaffar Khan's program constituted a breach of the Congress Party's acceptance of the June 3 statement. He condemned the movement as a political maneuver to keep the Khan brothers in power, upbraided the Congress for supporting it while opposing the independence of the princely states,[1] and threatened unpleasant consequences if the Province did not join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. However, by his firm and bitter condemnation he admitted the League's deep concern over the new threat to its newly-acquired influence. On June 29 the League appealed to the Pathans to ensure that the referendum decided for Pakistan and promised that the subsidies and militia pay would be continued.[2]

D. Future of the North West Frontier Province

1. Indo-Afghan Relations. In spite of new complications arising from the frontier Congress Party's demand for an independent Pathan state, both Congress India and Pakistan have a common interest in maintaining friendly relations with Afghanistan. A further complication arises, however, from recent official Afghan representations supporting the Pathan independence movement and suggesting further that the frontier area should be given an opportunity to rejoin the "Motherland of Afghanistan."[3] Both the Muslim League and the

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1. New York Times, June 29, 1947.
2. Ibid., June 30, 1947.
3. T-3458, London, June 24, 1947.

Congress Party, attacking Afghan intervention in Indian internal affairs, warned that Afghanistan thereby invited interference in its own internal affairs. The Muslim League described Afghan press support for Pathanistan as being harmful to Indian Muslims by suggesting a program which would perpetuate, in a Muslim area, the domination of leaders sympathetic with the Hindu Congress.[1]

However strongly the Indians may object to Afghanistan's claims sooner or later Pakistan or Congress India or both must negotiate with Afghanistan if the stability of the Indo-Afghan borderland is to be assured. Both Indian states will be concerned about Soviet infiltration tactics into Afghanistan, especially in the tribal territory on the border. The Indian state administering the NWFP will have little choice but to continue the established British policy of striving for Indo-Afghan cooperation in border control and to initiate active measures from the Indian side of the border. Although neither the Muslim League nor the Congress Party has indicated that they intend to continue India's subsidy and special facilities to Afghanistan, friendly Indian relations with Afghanistan will be sought unless the movement for an independent frontier state undermines the possibility of a peaceful settlement in that area.

2. Indo-Soviet Relations. Both League and Congress leaders are apparently agreed that Pakistan and Congress India, jointly or separately, would be unable to resist an invasion from the USSR. The experiences of the recent war have done a great deal to foster the common Indian conviction, however, that Britain supported by the United States can be relied on for assistance in the event of such a possibility. Both groups are aware of Soviet pressure in the Middle East, but both seem to share the view that the USSR's

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1. New York Times, June 30, 1947 and July 6, 1947.

relations with themselves need not be hostile. Neither party would be averse, however, to accepting the cooperation of the British in maintaining the defences of the northwest frontier, and to offering assistance to Afghanistan if it is needed to forestall Soviet infiltration.

Any unilateral effort on the part of Britain to perpetuate guardianship of the frontier would place the British in an impossible position between an expanding Soviet Union and a suspicious and hostile India. As the Congress Party has been particularly wary of British intentions, any British arrangement with Pakistan or Afghanistan for the defense of north western India that excluded Congress India would inevitably be challenged. Congress Party leaders can be expected to exploit every possible means, including the particularist Pathanistan movement, to prevent Pakistan from gaining prestige and possible military aid from abroad as sole guardian of India's most strategic frontier.

3. Future Relations with Tribes. During recent years British frontier officials have become increasingly convinced that the tribal problem is not essentially a military one.[1] They proposed replacing the Indian Army with reinforced and enlarged tribal militias, and inaugurating a general scheme for the economic development of the tribal territory. Current British policy follows this advice to the extent of strengthening the militia and introducing in the tribal areas improved education, irrigation, and modern agricultural methods. British departure by June 1948 will leave the problem only partially solved, so that to Congress India, to Pakistan, or to both will go the responsibility of finishing the work of pacification begun by the British nearly a century ago. If general confusion should develop, much of the British achievement

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1. REF-CID-64802, January 24, 1944.

would be lost.

In view of the decision of the Red Shirt Party to boycott the July 1947 referendum, the outcome will presumably be in favor of Pakistan. As the boycotting Congress Government will nevertheless continue to command a majority in the Provincial Assembly, it will probably refuse to resign and will attempt to contest the issue in a new election on the more favorable issue of Pathan nationalism versus Muslim communalism. A bitter controversy is forseen unless League leaders offer favorable terms of affiliation to Pakistan.

If the Province should eventually be assimilated into Pakistan, the Khan brothers' party can be expected to head a strong opposition movement which will attack any concession to continued British influence on the frontier and attempt to maintain outside contacts with Congress India and possibly with Afghanistan. Although the Muslim League at the outset will probably retain British personnel in military and administrative posts, it will be obliged in time to replace them with Pathan leaders as a concession to local opinion and as a minimum basis for maintaining peaceful relations with Congress India. A Pakistan Government will probably follow a tribal policy closely akin to that of the British, League spokesmen having already promised the continuation of subsidy payments and the employ of frontier militia and police.[1]

The creation of an "independent" Pathan state, on the other hand, would greatly complicate the entire frontier picture and would presage the complete consolidation of the settled and unsettled areas. A Pathan administration of an independent Pathan state might be able to win more active cooperation from the tribes than was forthcoming in any past administration. The police, milita, admin-

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1. New York Times, June 30, 1947.

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1. New York Times, June 30, 1947.

istration and legislature would undoubtedly consist of Pathans primarily under the leadership of the Khan brothers, and they could be expected to cultivate such figures as the Faqir of Ipi whose influence and prestige make him a natural leader in the tribal territory. But governmental control over tribal areas will be tenuous at best.

A very serious aspect in this movement for an independent frontier state is that it strengthens particularism throughout India, especially within the Princely States, and may aggravate the recalcitrance of Muslims living within Congress India. Nor could any frontier separation be complete because an "independent" Pathanistan would be forced to conclude military and trade agreements with not only Pakistan and Congress India but with Afghanistan as well. Consequently, although the identity of the frontier administrative power is as yet indeterminable, both of the major factions within India as well as the Afghan authorities will perforce continue to be actively concerned with the future of the frontier territory. At the present, conflicting political and embryonic national pressures obscure the fact that the stability and development of the frontier can be achieved only by the peaceful cooperation of all interested parties.

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

English Miles
0 10 20 40 60 80

Settled Districts
Main Road
Railroad

Base From: *"India's North-West Frontier"*
By Sir William Barton, with Alterations and Additions.

72° 74° 36° 34° 32° 70°

CHITRAL
KASHMIR
Chitral
SWAT KOHISTAN
Lawarai Pass
AFGHANISTAN
DIR
Peshat
Chamarkand
Khar
Nawagai
Kabul
Kabul R.
MOHMAND
Lalpura
Nahakki
Panjkora R.
RIGHT BANK SWATIS
Swat R.
LEFT BANK SWATIS
INDUS KOHISTAN
Black Mountain
BUNER
Dargai
Malakand
Shabkadr
Mardan
Oghi
Amb
Sittana
Hazar Nao
Dakka
Landi Kotal
Ali Masjid
Khyber Pass
Kabul R.
Peshawar
Abbottabad
Havelian
Murree
Parachinar
KURRAM
AFRIDIS
Bazar Valley
Fort Bara
Kohat Pass
Thurmana
Bagh
Masturg
ORAKZAIS
SAMANA
Chinarak
Hangu
BANGASH
Kohat
Thal
KHATTAK
BILANDKHEYL
TORI
WAZIRS
Miram Shah
Idak
Datta Khel
MADDA KHEYL
KHAISORAI
SHAM
Razmak
Arsalko
BANNU
Kurram R.
Tochi R.
Rawalpindi
PUNJAB
Gujrat
Kundian
Kaniguram
MAHSUDS
Jandola
BHITTANNI
Manzai
Wana
Splitoi
WAZIRISTAN
DERA ISMAIL KHAN
Kajuri Kach
Zarmelan
Gomal R.
Dera Ismail Khan
Bhakkar
BALUCHISTAN